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Introduction  
For many individuals, gambling is a popular form of leisure and social entertainment. 
However, for a small percentage of population it represents a serious disorder (Petry et al., 
2005). The severity of gambling involvement varies in a continuum from non-problematic 
gambling through to pathological gambling. Problem gambling is less severe than 
pathological gambling, a psychopathological condition that satisfies diagnostic criteria for 
gambling disorder (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
 
Recently, the observation of endophenotypical and phenotypical similarities (Tamminga and 
Nestler, 2006) between gambling and substance addictions helped determine a change in the 
diagnostic classification of gambling from impulse control disorder (American Association, 
1980) to behavioral addiction (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Within the cognitive 
framework of addictions, much research has demonstrated the importance of attentional bias 
in influencing the course of such addictive disorders. Attentional biases refer to preferential 
allocations of attention towards stimuli related to the individual’s area of concern (Field and 
Cox, 2008). In the field of addictions, attentional biases comprise attentional allocation to 
addicted-related stimuli when compared to neutral stimuli and are deemed alongside other 
factors responsible for the maintenance and relapse in the disorder (Field and Cox, 2008; 
Rooke et al., 2008). The prolonged engagement in gambling activities increases perception or 
detection of gambling-related stimuli in the environment, which can trigger relapses through 
conditioned responses. Attention is a limited source, and directing attention towards 
gambling stimuli hinders the detection of alternative stimuli (Kastner et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, once a gambling-related stimulus has been detected, it can be automatically 
processed, making it difficult to divert attention away from it. 
 
To date, research on attentional bias in gambling has focused on selective attention, “a 
cognitive function that facilitates the processing of relevant stimuli and inhibits the 
processing of less relevant stimuli” (Franken, 2003; p.3). Several studies on gamblers have 
reported longer reaction times in detecting gambling-related words when compared to neutral 
ones (Boyer and Dickerson, 2003; McCusker and Gettings, 1997), and that their attention is 
gained by gambling sources of information to the point that they are slower to respond to 
neutral stimuli during a gambling episode (Diskin and Hodgin, 1999).  
 
Despite the heterogeneity of the adopted measures, the psychological literature has 
consistently demonstrated that gamblers’ attention is biased towards gambling information 
and that this effect is not observable in non-problem gamblers (Boyer and Dickerson, 2003; 
Brevers et al., 2011a, 2011b; Ciccarelli et al., 2016; Diskin and Hodgins, 1999; McCusker 
and Gettings, 1997; Molde et al., 2010; Wolfling et al., 2011). Nevertheless, some important 
aspects need to be addressed (Hønsi et al., 2013). The first issue relates the stage of cognitive 
processing during which attentional biases occur, on which there is a paucity of research. 
Research generally distinguishes automatic and strategic stages of information processing. 
The automatic stage is a type of processing that requires no awareness or control, whereas the 
strategic stage is a type of processing that requires intent and control (e.g., Moors and de 
Houwer, 2006). To date, most studies have employed attentional paradigms that alternately 
investigate initial orienting (Brevers et al., 2011b; Diskin and Hodgins, 1999) or maintenance 
of attention (Atkins and Sharp, 2003; Boyer and Dickerson, 2003; McCusker and Gettings, 
1997; Molde et al., 2010; Vizcaino et al., 2013).   
 
In fact, research concerning attentional bias in gambling has traditionally employed 
paradigms, such as the Stroop test or attentional blink, requiring a direct response to 
gambling stimuli, demonstrating a direct and explicit response to a valent (gambling) 
stimulus. The use of methods such as eye tracking or the Posner task is more suitable for a 
deeper understanding of the attentional components, even in overt situations. In fact, in this 
latter case, participants are required to pay attention and respond to a neutral stimulus 
appearing after a valence/neutral stimulus (probe) in a visuo-spatial task. If the participant’s 
attention is captured by the probe, the response will be more rapid if it appears in the same 
spatial location of the probe and it will be slower if it appears in the opposite side. This kind 
of paradigm, like the use of eye tracking, allows investigation of unintentional attentional 
allocation and the power of a valence stimulus among those with a gambling disorder.        
 
Similarly, there is little clarity about the components of attentional bias involved in gambling. 
Attentional biases may comprise (i) facilitated attention to relevant stimuli, (ii) difficulty in 
disengaging attention from relevant stimuli, and/or (iii) attentional avoidance of relevant 
stimuli. In relation to gambling behavior, facilitation refers to a faster detection of gambling 
stimuli when compared to non-gambling stimuli. Disengagement refers to a difficulty in 
shifting attention away from gambling information. Avoidance refers to an allocation of 
attention in opposition to that of gambling stimuli (Cisler and Koster, 2010).  
 
To date, only two studies have simultaneously addressed both the issues. Brevers et al. 
(2011a) found that problem gamblers more rapidly detect gambling-related stimuli and need 
more time in shifting attention from them, demonstrating both a facilitation in reacting to 
gambling-related stimuli and difficulty disengaging attention away from gambling pictures. 
The use of Eye Gaze Monitoring allowed the assessment of time course of attentional bias, 
concluding that both automatic and strategic stages of attention are biased in problem 
gamblers. In contrast to this, Ciccarelli et al. (2016) study found a facilitation bias in reacting 
to gambling-related stimuli only in the initial orienting of attention among problem gamblers.  
 
Examining the literature as a whole, there is a lack of research investigating the relationships 
between attentional bias and other aspects (such as motivations to gamble). Whereas in the 
field of substance-addictions, an association between craving and attentional bias has been 
found (Field et al., 2009), there has been only one study examining gambling disorder (i.e., 
Molde et al., 2010) – in contrast to others (Brevers et al., 2011a; Wölfling et al., 2011) – that 
has observed a relationship between attentional bias and gambling abstinence. 
 
Another motivation to gamble is to engage in the activity to suppress or escape negative 
emotional states. Several studies investigating the reasons to gamble have shown that a high 
percentage of gamblers rely on gambling to both regulate negative emotions (Blaszczynski 
and McConaghy, 1989; Dickerson et al., 1996; Gupta and Derevensky, 1998; Beaudoin and 
Cox, 1999) and to ameliorate mood, increasing arousal and experiencing excitement 
(Griffiths, 1995; Wood and Griffiths, 2007). Negative affect is also associated with a greater 
likelihood of gambling relapses (Daughters et al., 2005). However, no study has ever 
investigated the relationship between negative affectivity and attentional bias towards 
gambling cues.  
 
To further the understanding concerning attentional bias over a continuum from the absence 
of gambling problems, to gambling problems and abstinence from gambling, the present 
study was carried out with three aims. Firstly, it assessed attentional biases in non-problem 
gamblers, problem gamblers, and abstinent pathological gamblers. Secondly, it investigated 
craving and emotional distress levels across the three groups. Thirdly, it examined the 
relationship between emotional distress, craving, and attentional biases across the three 
groups.  
 
It was hypothesized that problem gamblers, compared to non-problem gambling controls, 
would detect gambling-related images faster than neutral stimuli in the initial orienting of 
attention, whereas among abstinent gamblers there would be an avoidance bias towards 
gambling stimuli in the maintenance of attention due to an intention to keep away from 
gambling. It was also hypothesized that problem gamblers would exhibit a higher level of 
craving and that abstinent gamblers would exhibit a higher level of emotional distress, 
compared to others. Finally, it was expected that there would be correlations between 
negative affectivity, craving, and attentional bias. Providing empirical evidence of a specific 
psychotherapy program’s validity goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, the study 
also investigated whether abstinence from gambling, regardless of the type of psychotherapy 
undergone, affects attentional biases, and whether abstinent pathological gamblers have a 




Three groups of Italian male gamblers (N=75 in total) participated in the study, aged 24 to 65 
years (Mage = 44.47, SD = 10.79): non-problem gamblers (NPGs; N=25), problem gamblers 
recruited at a gambling venue (PGs; N=25), and pathological gamblers with a diagnosis of 
gambling disorder according to DSM-5 criteria, enrolled in treatment at Department of 
Addiction of Local Health Trust in Caserta, (PGTs; N=25). They had been in treatment for a 
variable time period, ranging from 1 to 19 months (M= 6.96 months, SD= 5.63). Problem and 
non-problem gamblers were discriminated using South Oaks Gambling Screen scores: the 
former had SOGS scores equal to or greater than 3, whereas the latter had SOGS scores equal 
to or less than 2 (for details, see Table 1). The three groups did not differ significantly in age 
(NPGs= 45.60 years, PGs= 42.56 years; PGTs= 45.24 years; F(2,72)= 0.59, p= .56) or years 
of education (NPGs= 11.16 years, PGs= 10.84 years, PGTs= 11.68 years; F(2,72)= 0.57, p= 
.57). The sample comprised male-only participants for two reasons. First, to ensure the 
homogeneity of the sample, and secondly, because men are reported in literature as being 
more likely to engage in gambling behavior and have gambling problems compared to 
women (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Measures 
Modified version of Posner Task (PT; Posner, 1980). This computerized version of the PT 
was used with SuperLab 4.0 experimental software. A total of 40 gambling-related pictures 
and 40 neutral pictures were chosen from non-copyrighted images found on the internet. Of 
these, 20 gambling-related images and 20 neutral images were selected on the basis of 20 
independent judges’ evaluation (10 males; Mage= 26 years; SD= 3.8) assessing the gambling 
relevance, pleasure, and arousal of each image (on a 9-point Likert scale from not at all to 
very much). The gambling images that received the highest scores on gambling relevance 
(mean gambling relevance= 7.26) were chosen as gambling images. To match gambling with 
neutral images, further internet searches for neutral pictures were conducted. The non-
gambling images that received lower scores on gambling relevance (mean gambling 
relevance= 0.65) were chosen as neutral images. Gambling and neutral images were no 
different on pleasure (gambling= 2.26; neutral= 2.66) and arousal (gambling= 2.55; neutral= 
2.78). Gambling pictures depicted different types of gambling, such as slot machines, 
scratchcards, and lottery tickets, whereas neutral stimuli depicted objects similar for size, 
shape and colour (Field et al., 2009; Franken, 2003), such as petrol pumps, paintings, and 
watches. All the images had the same size (350 x 350 pixel) and were presented on a grey 
background on a 15.6” computer monitor.  
 
The PT comprised 160 trials for a total duration of approximately seven minutes. Each trial 
began with the presentation of a fixation point (“+”) (ITI; 1 cm in height) in the middle of the 
screen, between two rectangles (4.8 cm high × 6.5 cm wide). The fixation cross appeared for 
1000 ms and was followed by a cue (gambling or neutral) to the left or right side of the 
screen (with the same size as the rectangles) for a fixed period of 100 ms or 500 ms. When 
the cue disappeared, a dot (target), consisting of a blue circle, appeared in the left or right of 
the screen, in the same (valid trial) or in the opposite position (invalid trial) of the previous 
cue, and remained on the screen for 1500 ms (see Figure 1). After responding, the next trial 
started immediately. Following the procedure used by Posner (1980), 80% of the trials were 
valid (128 trials, 64 gambling and 64 neutral), and 20% of the trials were invalid (32 trials, 16 
gambling and 16 neutral).  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Each image was presented both for 100 ms and 500 ms. The manipulation of the cue 
presentation time allows the assessment of two different attentional components (e.g., 
Bradley et al., 2004; Field and Cox, 2008): the initial orienting of attention (facilitation 
and/or avoidance) (100 ms), and the maintenance or disengagement of attention (500 ms) 
(Field and Cox, 2008; Field et al., 2009). Each image appeared four times, for 100 ms and 
500 ms, in valid and invalid trials. Accuracy (errors) and response times (RTs) were 
recorded. 
 
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur and Blume, 1987; Italian translation by 
Cosenza et al., 2014). The SOGS assesses the severity of gambling problems in 20 items with 
a dichotomous answer (yes/no) concerning the frequency of gambling activities, the amount 
of money spent gambling, chasing losses, and the perceived inability to stop gambling. 
Scores of 0-2 indicate no gambling problems, scores of 3-4 indicate a risk profile for 
gambling problems, and a score of 5 or above denotes problem and (probable) pathological 
gambling. In the present study, the SOGS’ Cronbach alpha (α=.90, 95% CI [.88, .92]) were 
considered of good reliability (Nunnally, 1978). 
 
Gambling Craving Scale (GACS; Young and Wohl, 2009; translated into Italian for the 
present study). The GACS assesses nine items on a 7-point Likert scale (from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree), the subjective feeling of craving for gambling activities and 
comprises three subscales: desire (the immediate desire to gamble), anticipation (the 
anticipation of immediate and positive experiences from gambling), and relief (the immediate 
relief from negative states that was expected from gambling). Higher scores reflect stronger 
feelings of craving. In the present sample, Cronbach's alpha was .89 for the overall scale 
(95% CI [.85, .92]). The three subscales had adequate to excellent reliability for desire (α= 
.96, 95% CI [.94, .97]), anticipation (α= .71, 95% CI [.58, .81]), and relief (α= .81, 95% CI 
[.73, .88]). 
 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21; Henry and Crawford, 2005; Italian validation by 
Bottesi et al., 2015). The DASS-21 is the short version of the DASS and assesses 
psychological distress using 21 items, divided into three subscales (i.e., depression, anxiety 
and stress). Higher scores correspond to higher levels of negative mood states. The overall 
scale resulted in a Cronbach’s alpha of .92 (95% CI [.90, .95]). The three subscales had good 
reliability scores for depression (α= .87, 95% CI [.82, .91]), anxiety (α= .83, 95% CI [.76, 
.88]) and stress (α= .84, 95% CI [.78, .89]). 
 
Procedure  
Before the experimental session, all participants signed an informed consent form approved 
by the research team’s university ethics committee. The informed consent reported, in 
summary, that the study in which they were required to participate had the generic aim of 
evaluating the association between some psychological aspects and gambling behavior. They 
were assured about their anonymity in the study and about the possibility to withdraw at any 
time. Participants were tested individually in a quiet room, were seated 60cm from the 
monitor and were asked to read the instructions on the screen: “Now you will see a series of 
images followed by a dot. Your task is to respond as quickly and accurately as possible by 
pressing the right button of the keyboard if the dot appears to the right side of the screen, and 
the left button of the keyboard if the dot appears on the left side of the screen. When you are 
ready, press the space bar to start”. The target buttons on the keyboard were “a” for left and 
“ù” for right and were clearly marked with white stickers. Immediately after the PT, 
participants were asked to complete the self-report measures. After data collection, 
participants were debriefed about the real purpose of the research and were thanked for their 
participation without monetary rewards. 
 
Data preparation 
After selecting the reaction times of correct responses, facilitation and disengagement biases 
were calculated. Facilitation scores were calculated by subtracting reaction times for 
gambling-related stimuli from neutral stimuli in valid trials (i.e., RTs valid/neutral-RTs 
valid/gambling). Disengagement scores were calculated by subtracting reaction times for 
neutral stimuli from gambling-related stimuli in invalid trials (i.e., RTs invalid/gambling-RTs 
invalid/neutral). Positive facilitation scores indicate shorter reaction times in detecting stimuli 
appearing in the same position of the gambling cues compared to neutral images. Positive 
disengagement scores indicate an engagement of attention on gambling-related cues 
compared to neutral stimuli. Avoidance biases correspond to negative values of facilitation 
and disengagement bias and indicate a tendency to avoid gambling stimuli. Values not 
different from zero indicate the absence of attentional biases. 
 
Data analysis 
Statistical analyses were performed with the IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, 
version 20.0. The alpha significance level was set at .05. After removing outliers (RT<150 
and >1000), a repeated analysis of variance 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 on reaction times (RTs) was run, 
with group (NPGs vs. PGs vs. PGTs) as between factor and valence (gambling vs. neutral), 
validity (valid vs. invalid), cue presentation time (100 ms vs. 500 ms) as within factors. Two 
mixed 3 x 2 ANOVAs were performed on facilitation bias scores with one between-
participant factor (group: NPGs vs. PGs vs. PGTs) and two within-participant factors 
(facilitation bias at 100 and 500 ms). The same analysis was executed on disengagement bias 
scores. A single-sample t-test comparison was used to assess whether bias scores were 
significantly different from zero. Two univariate analyses of variance with craving (GACS), 
and emotional distress (DASS-21) as the dependent variables and two multivariate analyses 
of variance (MANOVA) with group as independent factor and the subscales of each measure 
as dependent were performed. Significant findings were followed by Bonferroni post-hoc 
tests. Associations among measures were assessed with zero-order correlations. More 
specifically, correlational analyses between significant attentional bias scores and DASS-21 
and GACS total scores were carried out. If correlation coefficients were statistically 
significant, correlational analyses between attentional bias scores and the subscales of the 
measures (DASS-21 and GACS) were run. 
 
Results 
Performance on the modified PT 
Reaction times (RTs) for correct responses were used for analyses. From a mixed ANOVA 
performed on RTs in the Modified Posner Task, significant main effect were found for 
Validity, F(1,72) = 151.23, p<.001, η²p = .68, and Time, F(1,72) = 96.30, p<.001, η²p = .57. 
RTs were faster for valid trials (RTs valid = 423.10; RTs invalid = 476.32) and for longer cue 
presentation (RTs 100 ms = 470.16; RTs 500 ms = 429.26), whereas the effect of Valence 
was not significant, F(1,72) = 1.96, p = .17 (see Table 2). 
 
No significant interactions were found for Validity x Time, F(1,72) = 0.21, p = .65, Valence 
x Group, F(2,72) = 0.25, p=.77, Time x Group, F(2,72) = 1.52, p=.22, Valence x Validity, 
F(1,72) = 0.11, p=.74, and Valence x Time, F(1,72) = 2.97, p=.09. The significant Validity x 
Group effect, F(2,72) = 4.87, p=.01, η²p = .12, indicated that PGs and PGTs took more time to 
respond to valid (compared to invalid) trials, whereas the Valence x Validity x Group, 
F(2,72) = 3.42, p=.04, η²p = .09, showed that PGs had longer time reactions in responding to 
valid gambling-related trials compared to other groups. No significant interactions were 
found for Validity x Time x Group, F(2,72) = 1.08, p=.34, Valence x Validity x Time, 
F(1,72) = 1.34, p=.25, and Valence x Validity x Time x Group, F(2,72) = 0.63, p =.53.   
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
From the mixed ANOVA performed on facilitation bias scores, a main effect of Time, 
F(1,72) = 7.72, p<.01, η²p = .10, and an effect of Group, F(2,72) = 3.76, p=.03, η²p = .09, 
were found. There was no Group x Time interaction, F(2,72) = 2.29, p=.11. Analysis on 
disengagement scores showed no statistical significance for the main effect of Time, F(1,72) 
= 0.15, p=.70, the main effect of Group, F(2,72) = 0.92, p=.40, nor the Group x Time, 
F(2,72) = 0.06, p=.94. 
 
In order to test if bias scores differed significantly from zero, a single-sample t-test 
comparison for facilitation and disengagement bias was performed. Neither facilitation (100 
ms: t24 = 0.40, p=.69; 500 ms: t24 = 0.64, p=.53) nor disengagement bias (100 ms: t24 = 0.53, 
p=.60; 500 ms: t24 = 0.71, p=.48) was found in the NPG group. In the PG group only, a 
facilitation bias at 100 ms (t24 = 2.52, p=.02), but not at 500 ms (t24 = -0.93, p=.36) (Figure 2), 
and no disengagement bias (100 ms: t24 = 0.64, p=.53; 500 ms: t24 = 1.51, p=.14) were 
observed. PGTs showed a facilitation (avoidance) bias at 500 ms (t24 = -2.29, p=.03), but not 
at 100 ms (t24 = -0.87, p=.39) and did not report disengagement bias (100 ms: t24 = -.0.34, 
p=.74; 500 ms: t24 = -0.22, p=.83) (Figure 3). 
INSERT FIGURE 2 AND FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Current clinical status 
Emotional distress level (DASS-21) did not differ among groups, but a significant effect of 
the Group was found on the Stress subscale, with PGTs scored significantly higher than 
NPGs (p<.01). Regarding Depression and Anxiety scores, there were no differences among 
groups. Craving for gambling activities (on the GACS) differed significantly among groups, 
and post-hoc analysis showed that all comparisons were statistically significant, indicating 
that PGTs had lower levels of craving than NPGs (p=.02) and PGs (p<.001), whereas PGs 
showed higher levels of craving compared to the other groups (p<.01).  
 
Further analysis also revealed a significant effect of the Group on all its three subscales (i.e., 
Desire, Anticipation, and Relief). Bonferroni post-hoc demonstrated that PGs had high Desire 
compared to NPGs (p=.003) and PGTs (p<.001), whereas the other two groups did not differ 
significantly. With regards to Anticipation, all the comparisons among groups were 
significantly different, with PGs having higher level of Anticipation craving compared to 
NPGs (p=.01) and PGTs (p<.001), and PGTs having lower levels of craving compared to 
NPGs (p<.001). With respect to Relief subscale, PGs showed higher levels of craving 
compared to NPGs (p=.03) and PGTs (p=.001) whereas the other differences did not reach 
significant difference (see Table 3). 
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Correlational analysis 
Correlational analysis, executed in order to evaluate the relationships between measures, 
revealed significant associations between facilitation bias at 100 ms and anticipation craving 
(GACS) (r= .259; p= .02) and GACS total score (r= .274; p= .02).  
 
Discussion 
The present study aimed to establish which stage of information processing and which 
components of attentional bias are involved in the severity of gambling problems, using a 
group of non-problem gamblers (NPGs), a group of problem gamblers (PGs), and a group of 
abstinent pathological gamblers in treatment (PGTs) with a diagnosis of gambling disorder 
according to DSM-5 criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). For the first time, 
attentional bias in abstinent pathological gamblers was evaluated, not with the scope to prove 
the efficacy of a specific model of psychotherapy, but in order to understand attentional 
biases pattern in the discontinuation of gambling activities. To answer these questions, a 
modified version of Posner Task (Posner, 1980) was used. The Posner Task is an attentional 
paradigm that allows the manipulation of cue presentation time, thus assessing both the early 
orientation (100 ms) and the maintenance of attention (500 ms). 
 
Interestingly, each group had a specific attentional pattern. In NPGs, no difference between 
attentional detection of neutral and gambling-related stimuli was found, and was therefore in 
line with results of past studies showing that no attentional bias is observable in the absence 
of problem gambling (e.g., Brevers et al., 2011a, 2011b; Ciccarelli et al., 2016; Wolfling et 
al., 2011). PGs took less time to respond when presented with gambling-related pictures in 
the early orientation of attention. This finding is in line with several studies that have found 
that PGs are faster to detect gambling-related changes (Brevers et al., 2011a; McCusker and 
Gettings, 1997; Molde et al., 2010) and to react to probes replacing gambling-related stimuli 
(Field and Cox, 2008). The findings of the present study also suggest that the repeated 
gambling experiences may make salient the addiction-related cues that were detected more 
easily and automatically.  
 
Contrary to other studies (e.g., Grant and Bowling, 2015; Vizcaino et al., 2013), the present 
research did not find bias in the maintenance of attention among PGs. Reasons for this could 
include the various instruments used to assess biases, the exclusive evaluation of the 
maintenance stage of attention in these studies, and/or the different samples recruited (Grant 
and Bowling, 2015; Vizcaino et al., 2013). Furthermore, to check whether the non-significant 
disengagement biases were due to a lack of statistical power, a post-hoc power analysis with 
the program G*Power (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) with power (1 - β) set at the 
recommended .80 level (Cohen, 1988) and α= .05 was conducted. Results showed that 
sample size should be increased up to N= 1,083,903 for the significant effect of Time, and to 
N= 8,484 for the significant effect of Group, in order to reach statistical significance at the 
.05 level. Therefore, it is legitimate to conclude that negative findings related to 
disengagement bias cannot be attributed to a limited sample size.  
 
The PGTs showed an avoidance bias in the maintenance of attention, namely a shift of 
attention away from gambling-related pictures, which may suggest an attempt to ignore 
gambling stimuli. This finding highlighted that while PGs’ attention was captured in an 
automatic and uncontrollable way by gambling cues, PGTs tried strategically to allocate 
attention away from gambling stimuli. However, these results could also be due to a reduced 
attentional shifting ability among PGTs. For instance, abstinent gamblers might feel negative 
emotions or distress when perceiving gambling stimuli. Consequently, such feelings could 
impede the correct processing of all of the stimuli following the gambling stimulus. In other 
words, both attention and/or feelings towards gambling stimuli could perhaps hamper the 
subsequent correct detection of neutral stimuli. However, the specific process is, the present 
study demonstrated a slower detection of neutral stimuli following presentation of gambling 
cues in abstinent gamblers only, and only in the valid condition. Further studies are needed to 
better explain the exact nature of these attentional patterns and the specific role of attentional 
avoidance or of negative emotions in detecting gambling stimuli. For instance, measuring 
heart rate and/or eye movements during a Posner task could be useful in fully understanding 
the psychophysiological pattern and eye orientation during gambling stimuli detection.   
The lack of bias in the early attentional orientation in PGTs contrasts with the review by Field 
and Cox (2008), in which the authors stated that, differently from the slower aspects of 
attentional bias (that are likely to change under treatment), the automatic components of 
attention are not liable neither to control nor to modification. However, the authors 
themselves concluded that their assertion needs further empirical research. Additionally, the 
abstinence presumably deconditioned the PGT group from gambling stimuli. The absence of 
a baseline assessment of attentional bias in PGTs prevents us from understanding whether a 
change in the pattern of bias occurred during psychotherapeutic treatment. In this regard, 
specific clinical interventions aimed at reducing attentional bias (such as “attentional bias 
modification” programs) are necessary (Hønsi et al., 2013). 
 
Another aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between attentional bias for 
gambling-related cues and craving. In contrast to previous studies (i.e., Brevers et al., 2011a; 
Wölfling et al., 2011), a relationship between craving and facilitation bias in the early 
orientation of attention emerged, confirming that, after repeated experience of gambling, 
gambling-related stimuli acquire salience, becomes the object of craving and triggers object 
addiction-related seeking behavior (Robinson and Berridge, 1993, 2008). These contrasting 
patterns of results across studies may be attributable to the different characteristics of samples 
that reported different levels of craving. In the study by Brevers et al. (2011a), participants 
were mainly PGs while, in the present study, approximately 68% of the PGs met the criteria 
for probable pathological gambling (SOGS ≥ 5). According to Young and Wohl (2009), the 
Gambling Craving Scale (GACS) allows the discrimination of different levels of gambling 
severity, since craving scores are higher among individuals with a more problematic 
gambling involvement. 
 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the lack of association between emotional distress and attentional 
bias might be accounted for by a low negative affectivity at the time of assessment. Indeed, 
the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21) required people to indicate their emotional 
distress in the past two weeks and the analyses on scores of the scale revealed that there were 
no significant differences between the three groups. The only significant difference between 
groups was related to stress – high levels of stress were observed in PGTs, in line with studies 
that have reported stress to be an independent predictor of gambling urges (Elman et al., 
2010) and that have demonstrated the role of stress in the onset, maintenance (Coman et al., 
1997; Friedland et al., 1992) and relapse of problem gambling (McCartney, 1995). 
Alternatively, the use of game as a way to ameliorate mood (Wood and Griffiths, 2007) may 
occur automatically, in the lack of awareness of one’s own emotional states. In this regard, 
previous studies have found that PGs lack emotional awareness (e.g., Mitrovic and Brown, 
2009; Williams et al., 2012).   
 
Limitations  
Despite the many novel strengths of the present study, several limitations should be noted. 
Firstly, the absence of a measure of attentional bias in the PGT group at baseline prevents the 
comparison between before and after abstinence and, therefore, limits the understanding of 
attentional biases in the discontinuation of gambling and not. Secondly, the sample size 
restricts generalizing of the results. The findings need to be extended by further research on a 
larger sample of gamblers (NPGs, PGs and PGTs). Thirdly, the lack of a non-gambler group 
and female participants means there are limitations in elucidating the attentional biases across 
the gambling continuum and gender, limiting conclusions of the present research. Fourthly, 
given that the Posner Task is an indirect measure of attentional bias (i.e., it does not directly 
assess participants' eye movements) the present findings should be interpreted with caution 
and need to be corroborated by further future research using other attentional research 
paradigms. Finally, the study is limited to Italian gamblers. Extending this research to 
gamblers in other countries is needed to understand whether these findings are applicable to 
other populations. Future research also needs to clarify whether and how attentional biases 
are correlated with other aspects of gambling behavior. 
 
Conclusions  
To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to evaluate attentional biases, craving, and 
emotional distress in abstinent pathological gamblers undergoing treatment. The facilitation 
for gambling cues in the early orientation of attention in PGs, and the attentional avoidance 
from gambling stimuli in the maintenance of attention in PGTs suggest that attentional bias is 
an important factor both in the onset and in the extinction of gambling behavior. The 
observed association between the feeling of “wanting” gambling and facilitation in capturing 
gambling-related stimuli is in line with the incentive-sensitization model (Robinson and 
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